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INTRODUCTION
Whether a child can have more than two parents has become a hot topic.
Sources ranging from The New Yorker to People feature stories with
multi-parent families.1 Attention-grabbing court decisions also take up the
question of whether and when a child can have more than two parents.2 And
recent parentage reforms at the state level have included multi-parent
statutes.3 Family law scholars, too, increasingly focus on the question.
Before 2000, only a handful of law review articles addressed

* Martin Luther King Jr. Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law. This Essay was
prepared for the Symposium entitled The Law of Parents and Parenting, hosted by the
Fordham Law Review on November 5, 2021, at Fordham University School of Law.
** Anne Urowsky Professor of Law, Yale Law School. For helpful comments, we thank June
Carbone, Clare Huntington, Elizabeth Scott, and Gregg Strauss. For outstanding research
assistance, we thank Margaret House, Susannah Howe, Joe Landman, Sonia Qin, and Becca
Steinberg.
1. See Andrew Solomon, How Polyamorists and Polygamists Are Challenging Family
Norms, NEW YORKER (Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/03/22/
how-polyamorists-and-polygamists-are-challenging-family-norms [https://perma.cc/F5SQDWMK]; Rachel DeSantis & Amy Eskind, Calif. Throuple Raising 2 Kids Say Their Unique
Road to Parenthood Is ‘Like Winning the Lottery,’ PEOPLE (Mar. 16, 2021, 5:03 PM),
https://people.com/human-interest/calif-throuple-raising-2-kids-reveal-unique-road-toparenthood-like-winning-the-lottery/ [https://perma.cc/TGV7-NE2Z].
2. See, e.g., E.N. v T.R., 236 A.3d 670 (Md. 2020); In re M.C., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 194
(2011).
3. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2022); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.460(3)
(2022); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 206(b) (2022); ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1891(1) (2021); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2022).
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multi-parenthood,4 but since 2010 more than twenty have extensively
analyzed the issue.5 Reflecting these developments, family law casebooks
now devote entire sections to multi-parent families.6

4. See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA.
L. REV. 879 (1984); Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren:
Actualizing Interdependency in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315 (1994); Randy Frances Kandel,
Which Came First: The Mother or the Egg?: A Kinship Solution to Gestational Surrogacy,
47 RUTGERS L. REV. 165 (1994); Alexa E. King, Solomon Revisited: Assigning Parenthood
in the Context of Collaborative Reproduction, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 329 (1995); James B.
Boskey, The Sheep Really Has Five Legs: A Child’s Right to an Entire Family, N.J. LAW.,
Mar. 1996, at 33.
5. See Sacha M. Coupet, “Ain’t I a Parent?”: The Exclusion of Kinship Caregivers from
the Debate over Expansions of Parenthood, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595 (2010);
Melanie B. Jacobs, More Parents, More Money: Reflections on the Financial Implications of
Multiple Parentage, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 217 (2010); Nancy D. Polikoff, Response:
And Baby Makes . . . How Many?: Using In re M.C. to Consider Parentage of a Child
Conceived Through Sexual Intercourse and Born to a Lesbian Couple, 100 GEO. L.J. 2015
(2012); Elizabeth A. Pfenson, Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen?: The Potential Concerns of
Finding More Parents and Fewer Legal Strangers in California’s Recently-Proposed
Multiple-Parents Bill, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2023 (2013); Ann E. Kinsey, A Modern King
Solomon’s Dilemma: Why State Legislatures Should Give Courts the Discretion to Find That
a Child Has More than Two Legal Parents, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295 (2014); Emily B.
Gelmann, What About Susan?: Three’s Company, Not a Crowd: The Importance of Allowing
Third Parent Adoptions When Both Legal Parents Consent, 30 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 57
(2015); Josh Gupta-Kagan, Non-Exclusive Adoption and Child Welfare, 66 ALA. L. REV. 715
(2015); Judith Daar, Multi-Party Parenting in Genetics and Law: A View from Succession,
49 FAM. L.Q. 71 (2015); Stu Marvel, The Evolution of Plural Parentage: Applying
Vulnerability Theory to Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 64 EMORY L.J. 2047 (2015);
Deborah L. Forman, Exploring the Boundaries of Families Created with Known Sperm
Providers: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 41, 93–94 (2016); Jason
de Jesus, When It Comes to Parents, Three’s No Longer a Crowd: California’s Answer to In
re M.C., 49 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 779 (2016); Myrisha S. Lewis, Biology, Genetics, Nurture, and
the Law: The Expansion of the Legal Definition of Family to Include Three or More Parents,
16 NEV. L.J. 743 (2016); Michelle R. Gros, Since You Brought It Up: Is Legally Separating a
Child from a Nonbiological Third Party Who Has Essentially Become the Child’s
Psychological Parent Really in the Best Interests of the Child?, 44 S.U. L. REV. 367 (2017);
Haim Abraham, A Family Is What You Make It?: Legal Recognition and Regulation of
Multiple Parents, 25 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & LAW 405 (2017); June Carbone & Naomi
Cahn, Parents, Babies, and More Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 9 (2017) [hereinafter
Carbone & Cahn, More Parents]; Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Custody and Visitation in
Families with Three (or More) Parents, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 399 (2018) [hereinafter Cahn &
Carbone, Three (or More) Parents]; Tricia Kazinetz, Note, You Can’t Have One Without the
Other: Why the Legalization of Same Sex Marriage Created a Need for Courts to Have
Discretion in Granting Legal Parentage to More than Two Individuals, 24 WIDENER L. REV
179 (2018); Colleen M. Quinn, Mom, Mommy & Daddy and Daddy, Dad & Mommy: Assisted
Reproductive Technologies & the Evolving Legal Recognition of Tri-Parenting, 31 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS. 175 (2018); Mallory Ullrich, Tri-Parenting on the Rise: Paving the
Way for Tri-Parenting Families to Receive Recognition Through Preconception Agreements,
71 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 909 (2019); Catherine Reagan, Note, One Parent, Two Parents, Three
Parents, More?: California’s Third Parent Law Should Go Back to the Floor, 52 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 2165 (2019); Iris Siadatifard, Comment, You, Me, and Dad?: An Update on the
Progression of Multi-Parent Families and the Governing Hand of a Child’s Best Interest, 33
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAWS. 249 (2020); Jacqueline V. Gaines, The Legal Quicksand 2+
Parents: The Need for a National Definition of a Legal Parent, 46 U. DAYTON L. REV. 105
(2021).
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Discussion of multi-parent families tends to treat the phenomenon as both
new and rare.7 In many ways, this is unsurprising. Today, access has
expanded to various reproductive technologies and arrangements, including
conception with third-party gametes and family formation through surrogacy
agreements.8 In some cases involving assisted reproduction, intended
nonbiological parents treat a third person—for example, the individual who
contributed genetic material—as a parent. And with the advent of
mitochondrial replacement therapy (sometimes termed “three-person IVF”),
multi-parent families may now consist of three genetic parents.9
Legal developments tend to reinforce the assumption that multi-parent
families are novel and exceptional.10 In the last decade, a handful of
jurisdictions have enacted statutes expressly allowing courts to find that a
child has more than two parents.11 Other states are considering whether to
adopt the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), which includes a multi-parent
option.12 As the 2017 UPA demonstrates, these multi-parent provisions
6. See, e.g., DOUGLAS NEJAIME ET AL., FAMILY LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA 862
(2021); D. KELLY WEISBERG, MODERN FAMILY LAW 797 (7th ed. 2020).
7. See Kinsey, supra note 5, at 303 (“With the increased use of [assisted reproductive
technologies], it has become more common for children to have more than two parents.”);
Siadatifard, supra note 5, at 268 (“Within the past few years states have begun to acknowledge
the existence of multiparent families.”); Raymond C. O’Brien, Assessing Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 27 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 1, 28–29 (2018) (“Just as surrogacy
challenged traditional notions of parenthood, the possibility of a child with more than two
parents—genetically or behaviorally—has arrived, prompting new issues . . . . Increasingly,
this debate over the rights of multiple parents will become clearer as there are more cases
presented before courts for judicial resolution.”). Of course, not all scholarship treats
multi-parent families as new and rare. For example, in 2008, Professor Susan Appleton argued
against “both supporters’ and opponents’ characterizations of legally recognized multiparentage as revolutionary.” Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 11, 15 (2008); see also id. at 22–23 (“In my view, these supporters overstate the need
for reforms because they understate the extent to which such disaggregation has already
occurred.”); Gupta-Kagan, supra note 5, at 716–21 (attending to multi-parent families in the
child welfare context); Carbone & Cahn, More Parents, supra note 5, at 17–20 (addressing
“stepparent families” and “unmarried families”).
8. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, 109 CALIF. L. REV. 401 (2021)
(chronicling the legal regulation of surrogacy in the United States).
9. David A. Prentice, 3-Parent Embryos, Gene Edited Babies and the Human Future, 32
ISSUES L. & MED. 233, 236 (2017).
10. Siadatifard, supra note 5, at 268 (“Within the past few years states have begun to
acknowledge the existence of multiparent families. As a result, state legislators have enacted
statutes that recognize more than two legal parents. Although similar in the general idea, the
legal recognition of multiparent families can be vastly different from de facto parentage.”).
11. See, e.g., COURTNEY G. JOSLIN ET AL., GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY
LAW § 7:14 (2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-475(c) (2022) (effective Jan. 1, 2022) (“The
court may adjudicate a child to have more than two parents . . . if the court finds that failure
to recognize more than two parents would be detrimental to the child.”); S.B. 274, 2013–14
Leg. (Cal. 2013); S.B. 6037, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 513(3) (Wash. 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15C, § 206(b) (West 2022); ME. STAT. tit. 19-a, § 1891 (2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 8-201(c) (2022).
12. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); S.B. 1133, 192d Gen. Ct.
(Mass. 2021). In addition, some states permit so-called “third parent adoptions,” by which a
third person can become a parent through adoption without terminating or altering the rights
of the child’s existing two parents. See, e.g., JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 11, § 5:12. California
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usually appear within comprehensive parentage reforms aimed at
accommodating LGBTQ+-parent families and other families created through
assisted reproduction.13 This subset of families has garnered most of the
attention with respect to multi-parent arrangements.14 To the extent
commentators address other types of families, they tend to focus on
cutting-edge and unique arrangements—for example, polyamorous
families.15
The scientific, legal, and demographic developments that draw attention
to multi-parent families are important. Yet, the descriptive assumptions
embedded in many treatments of multi-parenthood—suggesting that it is a
newly emergent phenomenon, that it is unusual and limited to an identified

permits third parent adoptions by statute, CAL. FAM. CODE § 8617(b) (West 2022), while other
states do so through case law.
13. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT prefatory note (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); see also, e.g.,
MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., SECURING LEGAL TIES FOR CHILDREN LIVING IN
LGBT FAMILIES: A STATE STRATEGY AND POLICY GUIDE (2012), https://www.lgbtmap.org/
file/securing-legal-ties.pdf [https://perma.cc/XR33-GU5C]; Press Release, GLBTQ Legal
Advocs. & Defs., Rhode Islanders for Parentage Equality Coalition Launch (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://www.glad.org/post/rhode-islanders-for-parentage-equality-launch/
[https://perma.cc/X67P-WTJ8].
14. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 5, at 175 (“With the increasing use of assisted
reproductive technologies (‘ART’), including gamete (sperm, egg, and embryo) donation and
the use of gestational carriers and traditional surrogates, particularly coupled with the
recognition of same-sex marriages and other societal factors, our world is facing a new frontier
of [multi-parent] family formation. This new frontier includes the recognition of more than
two legal parents for a child.”); Kazinetz, supra note 5; Samantha Brennan & Bill Cameron,
How Many Parents Can a Child Have?: Philosophical Reflections on the ‘Three Parent
Case,’ 54 DIALOGUE 45 (2015) (focusing on families with same-sex parents); Gelmann, supra
note 5; Kinsey, supra note 5, at 303 (“With the increased use of [assisted reproductive
technologies], it has become more common for children to have more than two parents.”);
Laura Nicole Althouse, Three’s Company?: How American Law Can Recognize a Third
Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 173 (2008)
(“This Article proposes a theoretical framework for granting legal recognition to three parents
in the context of families headed by same-sex couples.”); Judith Stacey, Toward Equal Regard
for Marriages and Other Imperfect Intimate Affiliations, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 331 (2003);
Pamela Gatos, Note, Third-Parent Adoption in Lesbian and Gay Families, 26 VT. L. REV. 195
(2001); see supra note 1; see also Gabrielle Emanuel, Three (Parents) Can Be a Crowd, but
for Some It’s a Family, NPR (Mar. 30, 2014, 6:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/03/30/
296851662/three-parents-can-be-a-crowd-but-for-some-its-a-family [https://perma.cc/4A4N5AAV] (discussing a three-parent family consisting of a lesbian couple and a sperm donor).
To be sure, a number of articles on multi-parenthood do acknowledge that families featuring
more than two parents can arise in a wider array of circumstances. See, e.g., Carbone & Cahn,
Three (or More) Parents, supra note 5; Abraham, supra note 5 (identifying five types of
families in which children may have more than two parents); Gupta-Kagan, supra note 5;
Coupet, supra note 5.
15. See, e.g., Solomon, supra note 1; Briony Smith, Polyamorous Parenting: The
Surprising Benefits of the Ultimate Modern Family, TODAY’S PARENT (June 11, 2020),
https://www.todaysparent.com/family/parenting/polyamorous-parenting-the-surprisingbenefits-of-the-ultimate-modern-family/ [https://perma.cc/EWX6-YW4P] (focusing on
polyamorous multi-parent families); Mark Goldfeder & Elisabeth Sheff, Children of
Polyamorous Families: A First Empirical Look, 5 J.L. & SOC. DEVIANCE 150 (2013); see also
Lanfear v. Ruggerio, 254 A.3d 168 (Vt. 2020); Appleton, supra note 7, at 12 (introducing a
polygamous community as “one case in point” on controversy over a two-parent concept).
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subset of families, and that the law has only recently begun to accommodate
it—shape normative claims about the issue in problematic ways.
By addressing multi-parenthood as a novel issue implicating only a small
subset of families, commentators tend to treat the society-wide consequences
of multi-parent recognition as largely unknown and unknowable. Hence,
commentators routinely speculate about the effects of adopting a
multi-parent principle, worrying that the principle will bleed outside the
small number of families imagined to be the primary beneficiaries, thereby
threatening a wide range of other families adequately served by a two-parent
framework.16 Recognizing three parents in these “other” families, some fear,
will create and exacerbate instability and conflict in children’s lives.
Children will be torn between multiple authority figures who disagree about
child-rearing, and they will be shuttled between three or more households.17
It is not only children but parents who will suffer, as parents will have to
contend with the claims of third parties who inappropriately seek to inject
themselves into the lives of other people’s children. Critically, even scholars
who write supportively of multi-parent recognition give significant weight to
some of these concerns.18 In this Essay, we show that the consequences of
multi-parent recognition are more knowable than commentators assume.
Multi-parent families arise, and have arisen, in a variety of family
configurations.
And courts and legislatures have accommodated
multi-parent families for decades. In our account, multi-parent families
include not only those that are deliberately created to include more than two
parents from the outset, but also those that, over time, include three or more
individuals with claims to be treated as parents. Multi-parent families,
therefore, may exist when a child has two legal parents and one or more
additional individuals who assert claims based on functional parent
doctrines—that is, doctrines that extend parental rights to an individual based
on the conduct of having formed a parent-child relationship and functioned

16. We focus on objections from commentators who generally endorse family law’s
accommodation of a range of family arrangements. We do not, therefore, address objections
that are grounded in traditional gender norms and hostility to LGBTQ+ family formation. For
an explanation of these arguments, see Appleton, supra note 7, at 21–22. Appleton herself
worries that, if multi-parentage is used to add genetic parents “who are not fully contributing
to childrearing,” it might actually “offer a new opportunity for family law to reinscribe the
continuing importance of gender and bionormativity.” Id. at 54.
17. Gaines, supra note 5, at 121–22 (“The legal recognition of more than two parents
simultaneously who live in separate households is not in a child’s best interest because it
increases the number of adults entitled to time with the child. It further stretches the child’s
time between multiple households. As a result, there will be potentially three or more houses
that the child is shuttled to and from.” (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 122 (“There are
many scheduling challenges under the current two-parent structure, arising from coordinating
the schedules of two parents and a child with such items like school schedules; extracurricular
activities; parents’ work schedules; parties; holidays, birthdays, vacations, school breaks, and
weekends. Adding a third adult or more will only complicate scheduling further.”).
18. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 7; Carbone & Cahn, More Parents, supra note 5;
Joanna L. Grossman, California Allows Children to Have More than Two Legal Parents,
VERDICT (Oct. 15, 2013), http://verdict.justia.com/2013/10/15/california-allows-childrentwo-legal-parents [https://perma.cc/M9DZ-Z9EC].
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as a parent, regardless of whether the person is a biological or adoptive
parent.19
The fuller picture of multi-parenthood that we present allows us to ground
the multi-parenthood debate in a descriptively accurate account of the
phenomenon. This empirically grounded account responds to common
objections, showing that speculative concerns about the effects of
multi-parent recognition are either misplaced or overstated. Ultimately, an
analysis of multi-parenthood rooted in the wide range of contexts in which
the issue arises and in which courts have responded has the capacity to shift
the conversation away from questions of whether to allow multi-parent
recognition and instead toward questions of how to structure such
recognition.
This piece is the first in a series on functional parenthood growing out of
an empirical study of all electronically available cases from the last forty
years decided under functional parent doctrines, including cases that feature
more than two parental figures.20 Our goal is to provide a more empirically
grounded understanding of the circumstances under which a child may have
functional parents, including situations in which a child has more than two
parents, and an accurate assessment of the range of factual contexts in which
courts may be asked to adjudicate the issue. We supply a more
comprehensive and detailed empirical analysis of functional parent doctrines
in other work, and we plan to provide an examination of multi-parent
recognition on a national scale.21 But this piece draws on findings from one
jurisdiction with respect to multi-parent recognition. Our analysis of this set
of cases challenges assumptions that undergird the existing theoretical
dialogue about multi-parent families.
In Part I, we show how the growing family law literature on multi-parent
arrangements envisions a paradigmatic scene—an LGBTQ+-parent family
formed through assisted reproduction. We then show how this paradigmatic
scene shapes concerns about legal rules that authorize recognition of more
than two parents, leading scholars to treat the consequences of multi-parent
recognition on a wider range of families as largely unknown and threatening.

19. Across jurisdictions, these doctrines have different names (for example, de facto
parent, in loco parentis, psychological parent, “holding out” parent, or, as discussed herein,
transfer of parenthood by agreement) and different sources of authority (equitable, common
law, and statutory). They also yield different rights and obligations—in some jurisdictions
producing full legal parentage and in others leading to only some parental rights, such as
standing to seek custody. See Courtney G. Joslin & Douglas NeJaime, How Parenthood
Functions, 122 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at *15–22) (on file with
author).
20. See id. at *30–31 (discussing methodology).
21. See id. Our study is a comprehensive examination of cases decided under what we
describe as “functional parent” doctrines. More than half of the cases in our dataset implicate
multi-parenthood. We have excluded from our study other status-based grounds for according
parental rights and responsibilities with regard to a child to more than two individuals. Our
study does not, for example, include cases decided under stepparent or grandparent visitation
statutes.
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In Part II, we draw on evidence from our empirical study to challenge the
dominance of the paradigmatic scene of multi-parent family formation.
Using case law from West Virginia, we explore the kinds of families that
feature multiple parents and the way the law accommodates these families,
particularly in a jurisdiction that does not have a UPA-style multi-parent
provision and has not been particularly accommodating of LGBTQ+ parents
and others using assisted reproduction. Ultimately, we see that multi-parent
families have existed for decades in families with children conceived through
sexual procreation by different-sex couples. We also see that the law has
long responded to this reality by allowing the vesting of parental rights in a
third person, and that doing so can actually reduce conflict and increase
stability in a child’s life. From the child’s perspective, multi-parent families
may, on the whole, often be a virtue, not a harm. As the West Virginia
Supreme Court declared in a leading decision, “Oh that all of the children
whose fates we must decide would be so fortunate as to be too loved.”22
I. IMAGINED MULTI-PARENT FAMILIES
Scholarship on multi-parent families tends to envision a paradigmatic
scene—one made possible by recent medical and legal developments,
including expanded access to new forms of assisted reproduction and the
social and legal recognition of LGBTQ+ families.23 On this view,
multi-parenthood implicates a family that is not only relatively novel but also
relatively rare. While the number of families formed through assisted
reproduction and by same-sex couples has grown dramatically in recent
decades, these families still constitute only a small slice of the total
population of families with children.24
The paradigmatic scene of multi-parenthood emerges through the
descriptions and analyses that commentators offer to introduce and examine

22. In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 159 (W. Va. 2005). We refer to the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia, which is the state’s highest court, simply as the West Virginia
Supreme Court.
23. See, e.g., O’Brien, supra note 7, at 41 (discussing framing by Cahn and Carbone);
Forman, supra note 5, at 75 (framing discussion around lesbian couples and known donors);
Althouse, supra note 14 (focusing on same-sex couples who have children through assisted
reproduction); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two?: Disaggregating Traditional Parental
Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309 (2007)
(“[A]ssisted reproductive technologies (ART) make it quite possible to have more than two
mothers: the genetic mother, the gestational mother, and the intended mother. Similarly, it is
possible to have two fathers: the sperm donor and the intended father.”).
24. SHOSHANA K. GOLDBERG & KERITH J. CONRON, UCLA SCH. OF L. WILLIAMS INST.,
HOW MANY SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE U.S. ARE RAISING CHILDREN? (2018),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Same-Sex-Parents-Jul-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CES7-F775]; ART Success Rates, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/art/artdata/index.html [https://perma.cc/7JXQ-AAZ6]
(last visited Apr. 2, 2022).
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the topic.25 Scholars tend to cite cases, such as Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob26 and
LaChapelle v. Mitten,27 that involve same-sex-parent families created
through assisted reproduction.28 These cited cases involving LGBTQ+
families formed through assisted reproduction include those in which all
parties intend for there to be three parents from the outset as well as those in
which the status of a gamete provider29 or the person who gave birth is
contested.30 Relating the paradigmatic family to legal developments,
scholarly accounts often highlight recent statutory changes like California’s
statute or the 2017 UPA that expressly permit the recognition of more than
two legal parents.31
The scientific, demographic, and legal developments that garner the most
attention are surely important. Indeed, we each have written about them at
length.32 But these developments have had an outsized role in shaping the
discussion of multi-parenthood. The focus on LGBTQ+ families formed
through assisted reproduction and recently enacted UPA-style multi-parent
25. See, e.g., Noor Spanjer, The Rise of Multi-Parenting: These Five People Are About
to Have a Baby Together, STUFF (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.stuff.co.nz/life-style/life/
70873407/the-rise-of-multi-parenting-these-five-people-are-about-to-have-a-baby-together
[https://perma.cc/B5JQ-2F8A] (“Another new, lesser known family structure that has
emerged is that of multi-parenting—or raising a child with more than two legal parents. For
instance, a lesbian couple and a gay couple bringing up a child together as a single family, but
in separate households.”); Emanuel, supra note 14 (focusing on lesbian couple and known
sperm donor); Quinn, supra note 5, at 175; Jacobs, supra note 23, at 309 (focusing on
“heterosexual and homosexual couples us[ing] ART to have children”); Kinsey, supra note 5,
at 296 (“Three nights a week Bill Delaneys’ daughters spend the night with their fathers, a gay
couple, and for the remainder of the week, the girls stay with their mothers, a lesbian couple.”).
26. 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
27. 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
28. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 7, at 17; Gelmann, supra note 5 at 60, 68–69 (citing,
among other cases, LaChapelle, Jacob, Sharon S. v. Superior Court, and Between A.A. and
B.B. and C.C., all of which involve LGBTQ+ parents); Forman, supra note 5 (discussing
LaChapelle); Stanley Kurtz, Heather Has 3 Parents, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 12, 2003, 2:00 PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/2003/03/heather-has-3-parents-stanley-kurtz/
[https://perma.cc/3MGL-6YKU] (discussing Canadian case with same-sex couple and sperm
donor). Again, some scholars acknowledge a wider range of families in which
multi-parenthood can arise. See, e.g., Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat,
Between Function and Form: Towards a Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20
GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 482–83 (2013) (addressing stepparents and open adoption, in
addition to LGBTQ+ families); Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 47, 53–58 (2007) (discussing research showing prevalence of “community parenting”);
Gupta-Kagan, supra note 5, at 716–21; Cahn & Carbone, Three (or More) Parents, supra note
5, at 17–20.
29. Compare Kurtz, supra note 28 (discussing Canadian case where the three parents
jointly petitioned), with Appleton, supra note 7, at 17 (discussing Jacob).
30. See, e.g., Frank G. v. Renee P.-F., 37 N.Y.S.3d 155 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (involving
dispute between gay male intended parents and the woman who gave birth to the child, who
was the sister of one of the intended parents).
31. See, e.g., Pfenson, supra note 5, at 2058–60. Again, some scholars have taken a
broader view of the relevant law. See, e.g., Cahn & Carbone, Three (or More) Parents, supra
note 5, at 20–34 (addressing not only recent legislation but also common law and equitable
doctrines that raise the possibility of multi-parent recognition); Jacobs, supra note 5, at 227–
30 (discussing Louisiana’s “dual paternity” doctrine).
32. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260 (2017);
Courtney G. Joslin, Preface to the UPA (2017), 52 FAM. L.Q. 437 (2018).
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laws generates an understanding of legally recognized multi-parent families
as novel and rare. Moreover, by imagining that only a small and emergent
group of families needs multi-parent recognition and that legal responses to
these families are new, scholars tend to treat the society-wide impact of
multi-parent recognition as largely unknown and unknowable.
Application of the principle to a broader array of families is typically
posited as an unintended (and potentially inappropriate) spillover effect of a
doctrine meant to apply to a different population of families. Because the
concept is framed as new and emergent, identified concerns are speculative
and theoretical. From this perspective, a small group of families formed by
LGBTQ+ parents and through assisted reproduction may benefit from
multi-parent recognition, but application of the principle more broadly may
wreak havoc on other families.33
On this view, multi-parent recognition poses a threat to existing parents,
undermining their parental authority in ways that implicate “the
constitutional presumption that the parent knows what is best for the child
and will make decisions for the child accordingly.”34 This view tends to
assume that the existing parents are in fact regularly exercising parental
authority over the child, such that the potential for recognition of a third
parent is at odds with “the practical need for parental autonomy.”35 Some
commentators articulate more specific threats to parental rights. For
example, they fear that laws permitting multi-parent recognition will give
perpetrators of domestic violence a legal basis to continue to threaten, harass,
and abuse the legal parent.36 Accordingly, legal parents “who choose to end
relationships with non-parents should be trusted to make the best decision for
themselves and their children in the absence of an unfit determination.”37
Focusing more on administrability concerns, some fear that recognition of
multi-parenthood may prove unworkable.38 In a series of articles supporting
multi-parent recognition, Professor Melanie Jacobs describes the concern
that “there will be too many cooks in the kitchen.”39 Another commentator
worries about “a lack of a centralized authority figure for children” with more
than two parents.40 As Professors Naomi Cahn and June Carbone articulate
this dilemma in their work supporting multi-parent recognition, “managing
more than two parents effectively makes formal equality among them
challenging, if not impossible. The concern is not just that the third adult
33. See, e.g., Pfenson, supra note 5, at 2060 (“Children may be more harmed than
benefited by maintaining relationships with multiple adults because a child can only be
emotionally dependent on a limited number of people.”).
34. Id. at 2062–63.
35. Id. at 2063.
36. See Gaines, supra note 5, at 125.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Carbone & Cahn, More Parents, supra note 5, at 39 (explaining that “[s]ome
courts have rejected the possibility of three parents because of the uncertainties involved in
determining the presumptions that would apply to custody and child support”); see also infra
notes 37–45 and accompanying text.
39. Jacobs, supra note 23, at 326.
40. See, e.g., Gaines, supra note 5, at 122–23.
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will occupy a lesser position but that recognition of the third parent will alter
the relationship between the first two.”41 Worse yet, Stanley Kurtz fears that
multi-parenthood will make it “that much easier for any one parent to shirk
his or her responsibilities.”42
Perhaps the most pervasive concern with multi-parent recognition is that
it would introduce instability and conflict into children’s lives. At the most
general level, multi-parenthood seems “profoundly destabilizing” because it
would produce “too much change in a child’s life.”43 Commentators tend to
imagine that it is the legal recognition of the multi-parent family that results
(often suddenly) in the child being spread across multiple households and
pulled in various directions. These commentators also imagine that the issue
arises only when families dissolve and only when the parties are in conflict
with one another.
For example, Elizabeth Marquardt, a prominent critic of multi-parenthood,
analogizes to studies on children of divorce, who “must grow up traveling
between two worlds.”44 She worries that, like children of divorce, “the child
will get shuffled between homes.”45 As another critic puts it, “children will
be caught in three or four worlds.”46 “[H]ow,” another asks, “could children
be immersed in three different families, when it caused enough emotional
damage when limited to two?”47 The multi-parent family, on this view, is
not imagined to feature a “homelife [that] is stable, predictable, and safe.”48
Concern about sharing children across multiple households is part of a
broader fear that multi-parent families create conflict in children’s lives.
Cahn and Carbone identify this commonly expressed critique of
multi-parenthood: “[T]he greater the number of adults holding parental
status, the greater the potential for conflict.”49 Marquardt argues that
“[c]onflicts will undoubtedly arise when three parents confront the sticky,
conflict-ridden reality of child-raising.”50 Worse yet, scholars fear that
multi-parenthood doctrines invite state intervention, producing “nasty,

41. Cahn & Carbone, Three (or More) Parents, supra note 5, at 404. Cahn and Carbone
conclude that while these concerns “matter[] . . . , it is not clear that recognition of three
parents is necessarily worse than cases limiting recognition to two parents.” Id.
42. Kurtz, supra note 28.
43. Malinda L. Seymore, Inconceivable Families, 100 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at *43), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3912788 [https://perma.cc/R234-FXPW].
Seymore writes supportively of multi-parenthood.
44. Elizabeth Marquardt, Opinion, When 3 Really Is a Crowd, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/16/opinion/16marquardt.html [https://perma.cc/VGF3BERK].
45. Id.
46. Gaines, supra note 5, at 122.
47. Sara Alpert, The Past and Future State of De Facto Parents in New York, 55 FAM. CT.
REV. 458, 464 (2017).
48. Gaines, supra note 5, at 122.
49. Cahn & Carbone, Three (Or More) Parents, supra note 5, at 404; see also Appleton,
supra note 7, at 41 (“As the parental community expands, . . . the possibilities for . . . disputes
increase.”).
50. Marquardt, supra note 44.
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three-way custody battle[s].”51 As Professor Katharine Baker worries, “The
more parents there are with competing claims to a child, the higher the
likelihood that the state will become involved in the day-to-day business of
parenting.”52
As Baker’s assertion suggests, concerns about multi-parenthood rest on
assumptions not only about the nature of multi-parent families, but also about
the role of legal regulation. As Professor Joanna Grossman explains in a
largely supportive treatment of California’s multi-parent law, there are
“potentially costs to children, whose attachments to adults may be stretched
too thin by the legal recognition of additional ones.”53 Some commentators
assume that it is the court decision itself, rather than the actual arrangements
of the family, that leads a child to split time across multiple households.54
This perspective overlooks situations in which the child already lives in
multiple households, a reality a judicial decision may simply affirm, rather
than create. Thus, contrary to the fears of some critics, an adjudication may
simplify or solidify the child’s existing situation in some cases. For example,
the person seeking status as a third parent may be the head of the child’s
household. In some situations, a person who is parenting a child may need
to establish parental rights in order to preserve the child’s home and ward off
attempts by a biological parent who seeks to remove the child from their
long-standing home despite not having parented the child for years. In this
sense, multi-parent recognition may safeguard the child’s primary
parent-child relationship—from state intervention as well as from the claims
of other parents.
Commentators tend to imagine that the question of multi-parent
recognition will typically arise at relationship dissolution, in the context of a
child custody or child support dispute.55 As Professor Susan Appleton
observes in her supportive analysis of multi-parent recognition, even if some
of the families in relevant cases are “intact,” “the prospect of multi-parentage
becomes much more controversial upon the community’s dissolution.”56 At
that point, one might expect “animosity, possessiveness, factual contests, and
willingness to use children as pawns.”57 The tendency to focus on dissolution
51. Id.
52. Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L.
REV. 649, 675 (2008).
53. Grossman, supra note 18.
54. See, e.g., Pfenson, supra note 5, at 2053–54 (“Under this provision, a judge could
deny a parent custody and visitation with the reasoning that shuffling the child between three
or more homes would foreclose necessary stability for the child. An overtly or subconsciously
biased judge could enlarge the circle of parents to include adults that the judge might want to
be involved in the child’s life by failing to resolve conflicting presumptions. Then, using the
best interests standard, the judge could shrink the circle of parents with whom the child is
permitted contact under the guise of seeking stability for the child, in reality preventing contact
between the child and those adults that the judge disfavors for whatever reason.”).
55. See, e.g., id. at 2060 (“Children of divorce often feel caught between their parents;
fractured family units resulting from break-ups would be all the more painful for children if
they have three or four parents who they may feel are owed their allegiance . . . .”).
56. Appleton, supra note 7, at 40.
57. Id. at 40–41.
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not only obscures consensual multi-parent arrangements, but also neglects
other crises that may prompt court involvement, including the death of a
parent or child welfare intervention.58
Taken together, the message is clear: rather than help children and
recognize the importance of parental relationships in children’s lives, giving
legal effect to multi-parent families may harm children and undermine the
parental relationships that law should protect. This perspective grows out of
the assumption that multi-parent recognition is a relatively new legal
phenomenon intended to aid a relatively small subset of families. For other
families, then, the consequences of multi-parent recognition are largely
unknown—and worrying.
This perspective, however, obscures the range of actual families that in
fact feature multiple parents and the array of circumstances in which the
question can arise. It also overlooks the legal practices that long have
recognized and supported multi-parent families. Multi-parent families exist
across society. Multi-parent families include LGBTQ+ families and families
formed through assisted reproduction. But multi-parent families include
other families, too. The reality is that there have always been children who
have had more than two parental figures in their lives.59 For example, a child
born to a different-sex married couple may be the genetic child of another
man and may develop parental relationships with both the husband and the
genetic father. Michael H. v. Gerald D.60 presented such a fact pattern.61
And while Justice Antonin Scalia famously wrote that he “hope[d]” “the facts
of th[e] case [we]re . . . extraordinary,” family law lawyers know they are
not.62
Multi-parent families are not only long-standing; they are also relatively
common. Even before Michael H., the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted

58. See infra notes 74–85, 88–95 and accompanying text.
59. See Kessler, supra note 28, at 55 (“What has been less apparent in the discourses
surrounding divorce, cohabitation, ‘single-parenthood,’ and gay family rights, however, is the
extent to which children today may have significant family ties to more than two adults
concurrently.”); see also Kristina Brant, Social Parents in the U.S.: The Caregiving Roles of
Extended Family and Fictive Kin, in SOCIAL PARENTHOOD IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(Clare Huntington et al. eds., forthcoming 2023) (discussing history of multi-generational
caregiving).
60. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
61. Id. at 130. Indeed, the child at issue in Michael H. urged the Court to recognize and
protect her relationships with both men. See id. (“[S]he claims a due process right to maintain
filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald.”). The Court famously declined this request.
See id. at 118 (“California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood.”).
62. Id. at 113 (plurality opinion). To be sure, Michael H. and the scenario it presents have
received sustained attention from scholars, and many have advocated for multi-parent
recognition as an appropriate remedy. See, e.g., Suzanne A. Kim, Commentary on Michael H.
v. Gerald D., in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: FAMILY LAW OPINIONS REWRITTEN 187 (Rachel
Rebouché ed., 2020); Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood,
40 UCLA L. REV. 637 (1993); Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?,
20 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 387 (2012); Kessler, supra note 28, at 66; Melanie B.
Jacobs, My Two Dads: Disaggregating Biological and Social Paternity, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 809,
834–37 (2006).
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with cases that raised the prospect of two fathers.63 Many stepparent families
feature children who continue to have relationships (legal or otherwise) with
their parents of origin, but subsequently develop parent-child relationships
with a parent’s new spouse. In other Supreme Court cases, like Quilloin v.
Walcott,64 biological fathers sought to maintain relationships with their
children as the mothers’ new husbands sought to adopt them.65
Other families also feature multiple parents. In addition to two legal
parents, a grandparent, aunt or uncle, or other relative may be parenting a
child.66 A biological parent’s new nonmarital partner may become a third
parent. In some circumstances, a friend or neighbor may be parenting a
child.67 In most of these situations, the child already has two legal parents.68
In these situations, recognition of the functional parent—be it the stepparent,
or the new nonmarital partner, or the grandparent or uncle who is parenting
the child—will result in the child having more than two people the law treats
as parents or parent-like figures.
Like the families themselves, legal recognition of multi-parent families
exists in many forms. It comes through recent legislative enactments
expressly authorizing a court to find that the child has more than two parents,
and it emerges from judicial decisions resolving disputes involving LGBTQ+
families and other families formed through assisted reproduction. But it
comes through other legal mechanisms as well.69 All states have rules in
place that allow courts to allocate parental rights and/or responsibilities to
more than two people. In many states, functional parent doctrines grant
standing to seek custody or visitation to someone who has formed a parental
relationship with the child.70 All fifty states have third-party and/or
grandparent visitation statutes that authorize courts to award visitation (and,
63. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (noting that both the stepfather
and biological father sought parental rights); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978)
(stepfather sought to adopt child and biological father sought visitation); see also Bartlett,
supra note 4, at 927 (discussing Caban and Quilloin as cases in which “the children
understood themselves to have two” fathers).
64. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
65. Again, some scholars have attended to the multi-parent possibilities presented by
stepparent cases. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 231, 231–32 (2007); Bartlett, supra note 4, at 925–27.
66. See Brant, supra note 59, at *6–12.
67. See id. at *9.
68. Although, in some cases, one or more of the legal parents may be largely absent from
the child’s day-to-day life, and indeed, in some cases, one of the legal parents may be
deceased.
69. This Essay examines cases decided under doctrines that recognize people as parents
based on the conduct of having functioned as a parent. See supra note 23. As noted above,
we do not include in our study cases decided under doctrines that recognize people based on
their status—whether it be status as a stepparent, a grandparent, or as a birth parent who
relinquished custody. That said, we note these doctrines here to help sketch out a fuller picture
of the range of circumstances under which a child might have parental relationships with more
than two people.
70. Joslin & NeJaime, supra note 19, at *15–22; NeJaime, supra note 32, app. C;
Courtney G. Joslin, De Facto Parentage and the Modern Family, FAM. ADVOC., Spring 2018,
at 31.
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in some states, custody) to a grandparent or other individual who is not a
legal parent, even where the child has two living legal parents.71 At least
eight states have statutory provisions authorizing courts to award visitation
to a stepparent upon dissolution of the marriage between the parent and the
stepparent.72 The majority of states today authorize “open adoptions.”73
Where pursued, an open adoption allows the birth parents to enter into an
enforceable postadoption contact agreement with the adoptive parents. All
states regulate foster placements. In such placements, the child typically
continues to have legal parental relationships with their parents of origin (at
least for some time) but is cared for primarily by some other person(s). All
states also permit legal guardianship, “a judicially created relationship
between a child and a caregiver that grants to the guardian specific powers
and duties with regard to the child’s care.”74 While the guardian is granted
some parental rights and responsibilities, like the right to custody of the child
and the ability to make medical decisions for the child, this authorization
“does not sever the child’s legal relationship with his or her parent.”75
What would it mean to take a fuller range of families and legal
developments into account in assessing the reality and consequences of
multi-parent families? How would understandings of the phenomenon shift
if we were to attend to multi-parent families that do not announce themselves
as such? How would our view of appropriate legal responses change if we
were to consider cases in which a court recognizes that a child has more than
two parents, but does so in the absence of statutes explicitly authorizing such
recognition?
The next part presents an account of multi-parent families and legal
recognition from one jurisdiction—West Virginia. There are of course
limitations in drawing on an examination of cases from one state. Among
other things, in each state, there may be demographic and legal developments
that are unique or out-of-step with developments we see elsewhere.76 In
71. See Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to Seek
Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1, 2–3 (2013) (“Over a period of twenty
years, legislatures in all fifty states enacted statutes that allowed grandparents to seek
court-ordered visitation . . . . The most common grandparent (or third-party) visitation statute
specifically allows grandparents to seek visitation upon the divorce or separation of the parents
(thirty-six states) or upon the death of the parent to whom the grandparent is related (thirty
states).”).
72. Id. at 7 (stating that jurisdictions with statutory provisions for stepparent visitation
include: California, Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, and
Wisconsin).
73. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. CHILD.’S BUREAU, POSTADOPTION CONTACT
AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN
BIRTH
ADOPTIVE
FAMILIES
2
(2019),
AND
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/cooperative.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N9MC-STWL]
(stating that, as of 2018, “[a]pproximately 29 States and the District of Columbia currently
have statutes that allow written and enforceable agreements for contact after the finalization
of an adoption.”).
74. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, STANDBY GUARDIANSHIP 1 (2018),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/guardianship.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7AV-XHLM].
75. Id.
76. For example, West Virginia has been hit particularly hard by the opioid crisis. See,
e.g., Opioid Summaries by State, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/
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future work, we plan to provide a more comprehensive account of multiparent families and their legal recognition based on our national empirical
study. Still, a careful review of the law in one state illustrates shortcomings
in the debate over multi-parenthood up to this point. Our examination shows
that multi-parent families, as well as legal recognition of such families, are
neither novel nor rare. It also shows how the speculative concerns raised
with respect to multi-parent recognition are incomplete at best and inaccurate
at worst.
II. REAL MULTI-PARENT FAMILIES: LESSONS FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Data from our empirical study show that the reality of multi-parenthood is
more complex and less novel than the existing narrative suggests. We also
see that courts have accommodated multiple parents for a child even in the
absence of express statutory authority for more than two parents. By
analyzing this overlooked case law, we can test the speculative claims about
the effects of multi-parenthood. Focusing on these families and cases allows
us to see how multi-parent recognition may promote, rather than undermine,
stability, and lessen, rather than exacerbate, conflict in children’s lives.
We focus here on West Virginia, where a wide range of families feature
multiple parents and where state law extends some parental rights to a third
parent in a child’s life. West Virginia has not enacted the Uniform Parentage
Act, and certainly has not enacted the alternative provision included in the
most recent iteration of the UPA from 2017 that expressly allows courts to
find that a child has more than two legal parents.77 West Virginia lacks
comprehensive statutes governing assisted reproduction, and there is little
case law from the state embracing LGBTQ+ families.78 In other words, scant
law in West Virginia expressly addresses the paradigmatic case imagined to
implicate multi-parenthood.
Yet, West Virginia courts have developed and applied functional parent
doctrines in ways that accommodate multi-parent families.
Most
importantly, the West Virginia Supreme Court has interpreted its custody
statute79 to allow a “psychological parent” to intervene in child custody
proceedings in some circumstances. Describing this statute in its leading
drug-topics/opioids/opioid-summaries-by-state [https://perma.cc/B65Y-M9FP] (last visited
Apr. 2, 2022) (listing West Virginia as the state with the highest “2018 Opioid-Involved
Overdose Death Rate” per 100,000 people). In states hit hard by the opioid epidemic—
including but not limited to West Virginia—a significant share of children are being raised by
people other than their legal parents. See, e.g., Brant, supra note 59, at 7 (noting that in one
Kentucky county, the “proclaimed ‘epicenter’” of the crisis, “a 2020 elementary school survey
showed that 34.8 percent of students were being raised by a non-parental primary caregiver,
without a biological parent present”).
77. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 613(c) (Alternative B) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017); see also
Joslin, supra note 32.
78. NeJaime, supra note 32, app. A at 2366, app. B at 2369, app. D at 2375, app. E at
2380.
79. W. VA. CODE § 48-9-103 (2022) (providing that “[i]n exceptional cases the court may,
in its discretion, grant permission to intervene to other persons . . . whose participation in the
proceedings under this article it determines is likely to serve the child’s best interests.”).
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psychological parent decision, In re Clifford K.,80 the court explained that “to
safeguard the best interests of children, the Legislature has recognized that,
in certain circumstances, persons who are not a child’s parent or legal
guardian might also be proper parties to a custody proceeding.”81
The Clifford K. court ultimately defined a psychological parent as:
a person who, on a continuing day-to-day basis, through interaction,
companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills a child’s psychological
and physical needs for a parent and provides for the child’s emotional and
financial support. The psychological parent may be a biological, adoptive,
or foster parent, or any other person. The resulting relationship between
the psychological parent and the child must be of substantial, not
temporary, duration and must have begun with the consent and
encouragement of the child’s legal parent or guardian.82

Even as the West Virginia Supreme Court, in Clifford K., viewed the
custody statute as providing the basis for involving a psychological parent in
a custody proceeding, it found authority in a common law tradition that
predated the statute.83 As the court explained, “The psychological parent
doctrine is an equitable theory and judge-made construct which permits
courts, under appropriate circumstances, to recognize an individual who has
maintained a parent-like relationship with a child and consequently has a
right to continued visitation with that child.”84 Importantly, the court has
emphasized the rights of not only the psychological parent but also the child,
observing that “the equitable rights of the child” to continuity of care support
the doctrine’s existence and continued application.85
In addition to deciding cases under this psychological parent doctrine,
West Virginia courts have also used their equitable powers to enforce
parenting agreements between legal parents and people who were not the
child’s original legal parents.86 In child welfare proceedings, courts have
80. 619 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 2005).
81. Id. at 147.
82. Id. at 157.
83. Id. at 154–56 (relying on cases in which the court determined someone to be a
“psychological parent” or a “functioning father”).
84. In re K.H., 773 S.E.2d 20, 28 (W. Va. 2015).
85. In re Brandon L.E., 394 S.E.2d 515, 523 (W. Va. 1990). The psychological parent
concept aligns with decades of scientific research on child development. As the National
Research Council explained more than two decades ago, “parenting” does not necessarily
correlate with biological or legal relations and instead “capture[s] the focused and
differentiated relationship that the young child has with the adult (or adults) who is (are) most
emotionally invested in and consistently available to him or her . . . . Who fills this role is far
less important than the quality of the relationship she or he establishes with the child. The
hallmark of this important relationship is the readily observable fact that this special adult is
not interchangeable with others.” NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL ET AL., FROM NEURONS TO
NEIGHBORHOODS: THE SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT 226 (Jack P. Shonkoff
& Deborah A. Phillips eds., 2000).
86. A modern foundational case regarding this doctrine is Overfield v. Collins, 483 S.E.2d
27 (W. Va. 1996), in which the court stated:
“When a natural parent transfers permanent custody of his or her child to a third
person and thereafter attempts to regain custody of that child, the burden of proof
shall rest exclusively upon the parent attempting to regain custody of his or her child
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also relied on statutory provisions to allow people who are not legal parents,
but who are functioning as parents, to intervene and, potentially, be granted
custody of the children.87
Our examination of the twenty-eight electronically available published and
unpublished West Virginia cases decided under these doctrines demonstrates
that West Virginia’s functional parent doctrines are multi-parent doctrines.88
Twenty-seven of the twenty-eight cases we identified involve situations that
feature children with more than two people who are, or are alleged to be,
parents.89
Before proceeding, some clarification: we classify as multi-parent cases
situations in which one of the original legal parents has passed away and
another person in addition to the surviving legal parent is parenting the child.
We consider these to be multi-parent cases because, even when a child’s
parent has died, that child is still considered, as a matter of law, to be a child

by proving with clear and convincing evidence (1) that he or she is fit; and (2) that
a transfer of custody so as to disturb the child’s existing environment would
constitute a significant benefit to the child.”
Id. at 36.
87. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 49-1-204 (2022) (defining “custodian” for purposes of the
“West Virginia Child Welfare Act” as a “person who has or shares actual physical possession
or care and custody of a child, regardless of whether that person has been granted custody of
the child by any contract or agreement”); see also In re T.B., No. 20-0369, 2020 WL 6482958,
at *3 (W. Va. Nov. 4, 2020) (“Further, we have explained that ‘[a] person “who obtains
physical custody after the initiation of abuse and neglect proceedings—such as a foster
parent—does not enjoy the same statutory right of participation as is extended to parents and
pre-petition custodians.”’” (alteration in original)).
88. See Corey D. v. Travis R., 858 S.E.2d 857 (W. Va. 2021); In re D.P., No. 20-0499,
2021 WL 982769 (W. Va. Mar. 16, 2021); In re T.B., 2020 WL 6482958; In re L.H.,
No. 17-0769, 2018 WL 317057 (W. Va. Jan. 8, 2018); In re K.R., No. 17-1012, 2018 WL
1709713 (W. Va. Apr. 9, 2018); In re J.C., No. 17-0362, 2017 WL 4772949 (W. Va. Oct. 23,
2017); In re L.H., No. 17-0102, 2017 WL 5157367 (W. Va. Nov. 7, 2017); Andra F. v.
Anthony H., No. 15-0445, 2016 WL 700585 (W. Va. Feb. 16, 2016); In re K.H., 773 S.E.2d
20 (W. Va. 2015); J.E. v. L.A., No. 14-0137, 2015 WL 3751807 (W. Va. June 15, 2015); In
re B.C., No. 14-1174, 2015 WL 3752039 (W. Va. June 15, 2015); Bobbie Jo R. v. Traci W.,
No. 11-1753, 2013 WL 2462173 (W. Va. June 7, 2013); In re J.K., No. 12-0629, 2012 WL
5851434 (W. Va. Nov. 19, 2012); In re N.A., 711 S.E.2d 280 (W. Va. 2011); In re Antonio
R.A., 719 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 2011); In re Visitation and Custody of Senturi N.S.V., 652
S.E.2d 490 (W. Va. 2007); Overfield v. Collins, 483 S.E.2d 27 (W. Va. 1996); In re Clifford
K., 619 S.E.2d 138; In re Jade E.G., 575 S.E.2d 325 (W. Va. 2002); Baugh v. Merritt, 489
S.E.2d 775 (W. Va. 1997); Ortner v. Pritt, 419 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1992); In re Jonathan G.,
482 S.E.2d 893 (W. Va. 1996); Simmons v. Comer, 438 S.E.2d 530 (W. Va. 1993); Snyder v.
Scheerer, 436 S.E.2d 299 (W. Va. 1993); In re Brandon L.E., 394 S.E.2d 515; Honaker v.
Burnside, 388 S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 1989); In re Custody of Cottrill, 346 S.E.2d 47 (W. Va.
1986); State ex rel. R.H. v. Bloom, No. 17-0002, 2017 WL 1788946 (W. Va. May 5, 2017).
89. See Bobbie Jo R., 2013 WL 2462173, at *1. The only case in this dataset that is not a
multi-parent scenario is one of the “paradigmatic” cases. The case was an action seeking an
order of “sibling” visitation as between children from different families conceived using sperm
from the same anonymous sperm donor. In the action, the former same-sex partner of one of
the birth parents sought to intervene, relying on the psychological parent doctrine. Id. at *1.
Because the child at issue was conceived using “sperm [from an] anonymous donor . . .
acquired from a commercial service,” the child’s only legal parent was the birth parent. Id.
Thus, recognition of the birth parent’s former partner as a functional parent would not have
produced a multi-parent scenario.
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of two legal parents.90 Conventionally, the law would assume that a third
person could not become the child’s parent in the absence of an adoption. In
any event, most of the cases involving a deceased parent feature situations in
which the child had three or more parental figures before the legal parent’s
death. We also include situations in which the child has two legal parents
but is being parented by someone else, either alone or alongside a legal parent
or parents. We include such cases even if the legal parent or parents have
little to no contact with the child. We consider these to be multi-parent cases
because, even if the legal parents are practically out of the picture, the law
generally continues to treat them as legal parents with rights and obligations,
unless or until their parental rights are terminated by a court.
A. Who Are Multi-Parent Families in West Virginia?
The West Virginia cases present a picture of multi-parent families that
differs significantly from the paradigmatic scene envisioned in contemporary
debates over multi-parent recognition. Only one of the twenty-seven cases
involves an LGBTQ+-parent family.91 It is not clear that any of the
twenty-seven cases involve children conceived through assisted
reproduction.92 Instead, the cases out of West Virginia present a much richer
and varied set of fact patterns. The cases broadly fall into three general
categories.93

90. See, e.g., In re Estate of Quintero, 569 N.W.2d 889 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (per curiam)
(holding that children would have to disprove paternity of their presumed father, which they
lacked standing to do, before they would be able to establish paternity of decedent, their
alleged biological father, for purposes of inheritance); cf. L.R.B. v. Talladega Cnty. Dep’t of
Hum. Res., 223 So. 3d 923, 926 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (“[W]e are left to question whether, if
a child’s presumed father were to die, another man should be permitted to attempt to prove
paternity simply because of the presumed father’s death? We think not. In such a scenario,
the presumption in favor of the deceased presumed father would continue, unless the presumed
father could be shown to have relinquished his presumed fatherhood during his lifetime.”).
Indeed, after the death of a parent, the child may be receiving various protections by virtue of
that parent-child relationship such as social security benefits. See, e.g., SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
FOR
BENEFITS
CHILDREN
(2021),
https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10085.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DKR9-374E] (“During 2020, we paid an average of $2.8 billion of monthly
benefits to four million children because one or both of their parents are disabled, retired, or
deceased. These benefits provide necessities for family members and help make it possible
for those children to complete high school. When a parent becomes disabled or dies, Social
Security benefits help stabilize the family’s financial future.”).
91. See In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138. As noted above, one other case involves
LGBTQ+ parents. See Bobbie Jo R., 2013 WL 2462173, at *1. But that case does not feature
multi-parenthood, and therefore, is not hereafter included in our discussion of West Virginia
multiparent cases. See supra note 76.
92. Although one case involved a child raised by a same-sex couple, it does not describe
how the child at issue in the case was conceived. See In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d at 144
(“Thereafter, Clifford K., petitioner below, was enlisted to help Christina S. conceive a
child.”).
93. Some cases, like J.E. v. L.A., fall into more than one of these categories. 2015 WL
3751807.
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In seven of the twenty-seven cases (26 percent), one of the child’s legal
and biological parents has passed away.94 In five of those cases, the child
had three or more parental figures before the legal parent’s death.95 In one
of the other two cases, the third parent seemingly did not exercise custody
until after the legal parent died.96 In the remaining case, the factual record is
too scant to draw a conclusion.97
Clifford K. illustrates the most common situation, in which the child has
three parental figures even before the legal parent’s death.98 After the child’s
birth parent was killed, the court was faced with deciding whether to place
the child with the child’s psychological parent—a person who had lived with
the child since birth—even though the child also had an involved biological
father.99 In a more recent case, J.E. v. L.A.,100 the child’s mother died when
she was two.101 From the time the child “was only a few months old,” the
child had lived in her grandmother’s home “with the consent and
encouragement of both biological parents.”102 After her mother’s death, the
child continued to reside with her grandmother with her father’s “consent and
encouragement.”103 By the time the court decided the case, the child had
been living with her grandmother, who primarily cared for and financially
supported her, for approximately six years.104
In a second group of cases, the legal parents had contact with their child,
but the child was not living with either of the legal parents, and the legal
parents were not making decisions for the child. That is, at least as a practical
matter, the legal parents in these cases were not exercising either physical or
legal custody of their children. Seventeen of the twenty-seven cases (63
percent) present facts that arguably fit within this category.105 For example,
94. See In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138; In re K.R., No. 17-1012, 2018 WL 1709713
(W. Va. Apr. 9, 2018); In re K.H., 773 S.E.2d 20 (W. Va. 2015); J.E. v. L.A., 2015 WL
3751807; Ortner v. Pritt, 419 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1992); Honaker v. Burnside, 388 S.E.2d 322
(W. Va. 1989); In re Custody of Cottrill, 346 S.E.2d 47 (W. Va. 1986).
95. See In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138; Honaker, 388 S.E.2d 322; J.E. v. L.A., 2015
WL 3751807; In re K.R., 2018 WL 1709713; In re Custody of Cottrill, 346 S.E.2d 47.
96. In re K.H., 773 S.E.2d at 22, 28.
97. See Ortner, 419 S.E.2d 907.
98. In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d at 154.
99. See id. at 154–57.
100. No. 14-0137, 2015 WL 3751807 (W. Va. June 15, 2015).
101. Id. at *1.
102. Id. at *2.
103. Id.
104. See id. at *3 (noting that “[f]or approximately the past six years, throughout this
child’s life, respondent has provided for her day-to-day needs and substantially supported her
financially.”).
105. See In re Brandon L.E., 394 S.E.2d 515 (W. Va. 1990); Ortner v. Pritt, 419 S.E.2d
907 (W. Va. 1992); Overfield v. Collins, 483 S.E.2d 27 (W. Va. 1996); In re K.H., 773 S.E.2d
20 (W. Va. 2015); J.E. v. L.A., 2015 WL 3751807; In re L.H., No. 17-0102, 2017 WL 5157367
(W. Va. Nov. 7, 2017); In re D.P., No. 20-0499, 2021 WL 982769 (W. Va. Mar. 16, 2021);
Andra F. v. Anthony H., No. 15-0445, 2016 WL 700585 (W. Va. Feb. 16, 2016); In re
Jonathan G., 482 S.E.2d 893 (W. Va. 1996); In re Antonio R.A., 719 S.E.2d 850
(W. Va. 2011); In re K.R., No. 17-1012, 2018 WL 1709713 (W. Va. Apr. 9, 2018); Baugh v.
Merritt, 489 S.E.2d 775 (W. Va. 1997); In re Custody of Cottrill, 346 S.E.2d 47
(W. Va. 1986); In re J.C., No. 17-0362, 2017 WL 4772949 (W. Va. Oct. 23, 2017); In re T.B.,
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in Andra F. v. Anthony H.,106 the children lived with and were primarily cared
for by their paternal grandparents for significant periods of time. While the
father also technically lived in the house with his parents during some of this
period, he “worked away from the home during the week and was at home
[only] occasionally on weekends.”107 The father was later incarcerated. By
the time of the hearing on placement of the children, the grandparents had
been providing “daily care of the [child], including medical, dental,
educational, bedtime routines, providing meals and bearing all of the
financial obligations of the children without assistance from the parents” for
almost two years.108 In another case, In re L.H.,109 a person the court
described as a “Standing Grandmother” “reported that she had provided care
for [the child] since birth, less approximately an eight-month period when
Mother cared for [the child].”110 The evidence also indicated that the mother
went “long periods without contact” with the child, and provided no financial
support for the child.111 And the child’s father resided in Arizona.112
A final common subset of cases consists of those in which the child has
become child welfare involved.113 Fourteen of the twenty-seven cases
(52 percent) involve allegations of abuse or neglect.114 In these cases, it is
ordinarily the legal parent or parents, not the psychological parent, whose
conduct is subject to state investigation. In only two of the fourteen cases
was there an allegation that the person alleging to be a psychological parent
was abusive or neglectful, and in those two cases, there were also abuse or
neglect allegations against the legal parent.115 By contrast, in twelve of the
No. 20-0369, 2020 WL 6482958 (W. Va. Nov. 4, 2020); Snyder v. Scheerer, 436 S.E.2d 299
(W. Va. 1993); State ex rel. R.H. v. Bloom, No. 17-0002, 2017 WL 1788946 (W. Va. May 5,
2017).
106. No. 15-0445, 2016 WL 700585 (W. Va. Feb. 16, 2016).
107. Id. at *1.
108. Id. at *4 (emphasis added). For her part, “shortly before ordering supervised
visitation, [the mother] relocated and failed to provide any information about her living
arrangements to the guardian or the family court.” Id. at *5.
109. No. 17-0102, 2017 WL 5157367 (W. Va. Nov. 7, 2017).
110. Id. at *2.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. We recognize that the term “child welfare,” though commonly used by state and
nonstate actors, is subject to increasing contestation. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff & Jane M.
Spinak, Foreword: Strengthened Bonds: Abolishing the Child Welfare System and
Re-envisioning Child Well-Being, 11 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 427, 431 (2021).
114. In re Brandon L.E., 394 S.E.2d 515 (W. Va. 1990); In re Jonathan G., 482 S.E.2d 893
(W. Va. 1996); In re J.K., No. 12-0629, 2012 WL 5851434 (W. Va. Nov. 19, 2012); In re
B.C., No. 14-1174, 2015 WL 3752039 (W. Va. June 15, 2015); In re L.H., 2017 WL 5157367;
In re L.H., No. 17-0769, 2018 WL 317057 (W. Va. Jan. 8, 2018); In re K.R., No. 17-1012,
2018 WL 1709713 (W. Va. Apr. 9, 2018); In re D.P., No. 20-0499, 2021 WL 982769 (W. Va.
Mar. 16, 2021); In re Antonio R.A., 719 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 2011); J.E. v. L.A., No. 14-0137,
2015 WL 3751807 (W. Va. June 15, 2015); In re J.C., No. 17-0362, 2017 WL 4772949 (W.
Va. Oct. 23, 2017); In re N.A., 711 S.E.2d 280 (W. Va. 2011); In re T.B., No. 20-0369, 2020
WL 6482958 (W. Va. Nov. 4, 2020); State ex rel. R.H. v. Bloom, No. 17-0002, 2017 WL
1788946 (W. Va. May 5, 2017).
115. In re L.H., 2018 WL 317057, at *1 (“In February of 2015, the [West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources] filed an abuse and neglect petition against

2022]

MULTI-PARENT FAMILIES, REAL AND IMAGINED

2581

fourteen cases, there were allegations that one or more of the legal parents
was abusive or neglectful and there were no allegations that the alleged
psychological parent was abusive or neglectful.116 To be clear, we are not
making claims about the appropriateness of a child welfare proceeding in the
first place. Indeed, especially in light of the race- and class-based inequalities
that plague the child welfare system, we have serious concerns about the
government’s intervention.117 Instead, we are focusing on the role of
functional parents in these existing cases.
In many cases involving abuse and neglect allegations against the legal
parent(s), the child lives with another individual who may become a
functional parent. Often this person offers the child relative safety and
stability. For instance, in one case, prior to the filing of the abuse and neglect
petition against both parents,118 the parents agreed to transfer custody of the

petitioner and his girlfriend, the mother of L.H., alleging that the mother abused drugs during
her pregnancy with the child.”); In re N.A., 711 S.E.2d 280. In the case, abuse and neglect
allegations were made against the mother, the maternal grandparents who had been caring for
the children, and the biological father of children who were not at issue in the appeal. No
abuse or neglect allegations were made against the biological father of the child at issue in the
appeal; this man did not know he was a biological father of the child until the action was
initiated. See id.
116. See, e.g., In re Brandon L.E., 394 S.E.2d 515 (dependency proceeding in light of
mother’s diagnosis of Munchausen syndrome by proxy and evidence that she had medicated
her son for diabetes and a seizure disorder, neither of which he had); In re Jonathan G., 482
S.E.2d 893 (abuse and neglect proceeding after child’s diagnosis with “shaken baby
syndrome”); In re Antonio R.A., 719 S.E.2d 850 (allegations as to mother; investigation
concluded that the allegations “did not rise to the level of abuse or neglect”); In re J.K., 2012
WL 5851434, at *1 (abuse and neglect proceeding in light of mother’s drug use); In re B.C.,
2015 WL 3752039, at *1 (evidence of “acts of abuse by the[] mother, including striking [child]
with belts, slapping [child] with the back of her hand and pulling that child’s hair, and forcing
[child] to shower with his clothes on in scalding hot water”); J.E. v. L.A., 2015 WL 3751807,
at *2 (evidence admitted by the family court “that petitioner [father] was convicted in 2012 of
driving under the influence of alcohol (‘DUI’) and evidence of allegations that he sexually
abused the child in 2013 and sexually abused an older daughter years earlier”); In re L.H.,
2017 WL 5157367, at *2 (continued use of drugs, including cocaine and opiates, by the
mother); In re K.R., 2018 WL 1709713, at *1, *3 (abuse and neglect petition was filed against
the mother and her husband after “an incident in which the husband physically attacked the
mother and brandished a knife while he threatened to kill her, all in the children’s presence”);
In re D.P., 2021 WL 982769, at *1 (trial court found that the child’s “mother had abused
controlled substances while the child was in her care and the father failed to appropriately
supervise the child or provide a safe and suitable home”); In re J.C., 2017 WL 4772949, at *1
(dependency proceeding against father who had “been incarcerated on multiple felonies for
approximately two years” and who was alleged to have “abandoned the child and failed to
provide for her in any way”); In re T.B., 2020 WL 6482958, at *1 (dependency action initiated
based on “allegations of the parents’ drug use”); Bloom, 2017 WL 1788946, at *1 (dependency
action initiated alleging the mother and the father of two of the four children “had abandoned
their children”).
117. For excellent analyses of how this system disproportionately targets and, in turn, tears
apart families of color, see DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, TORN APART: HOW THE CHILD WELFARE
SYSTEM DESTROYS BLACK FAMILIES—AND HOW ABOLITION CAN BUILD A SAFER WORLD
(2022); DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 3 (2001).
118. See In re J.C., No. 17-0362, 2017 WL 4772949, at *1 n.2 (W. Va. Oct. 23, 2017)
(“Here, the proceedings continued against the mother until her rights to a child not at issue in
this appeal were eventually terminated in the same order from which petitioner now appeals.”).
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child to the child’s maternal grandparents.119 When the petition was filed,
the father “had been incarcerated on multiple felonies for approximately two
years.”120 During the proceeding, the mother’s parental rights with respect
to another child were terminated.121 In at least some of the cases involving
abuse and neglect allegations, the functional parent was caring for the child
before the state initiated the proceeding against the legal parent(s).122 For
example, in one recent case, the child resided with her grandmother, prior to
as well as during the abuse and neglect proceeding. According to the trial
court, the grandmother “was a dedicated primary caregiver, had formed a
strong bond with the child, and had cared for [the child] for a significant
period of time.”123
B. Child-Centered Reasoning in Multi-Parent Decisions
An examination of West Virginia case law shows that courts are
confronted with families in which recognition of a third (or fourth) parent
would promote, rather than undermine, children’s interests. That is,
multi-parent recognition can make the lives of the children in these cases
more stable and less conflictual—exactly the opposite of what many
commentators assume multi-parent recognition will yield.
The courts themselves explicitly elevate the welfare of the child, seeing
recognition of multiple parents as promoting the interests of the child,
specifically in stability and continuity of care. Indeed, the West Virginia
Supreme Court identified stability for the child as a key justification for the
state’s psychological parent doctrine. The lawsuit in the foundational case
of Clifford K. was prompted by the biological mother’s death.124 The
question before the court was whether to allow the child either to remain with
his psychological parent (the biological mother’s partner, who had been the
child’s nonadoptive, nonbiological parent), or to be placed with his
grandfather (the biological mother’s father).125 The child also had a
biological father who was a legal parent and entitled to custody.126 The court
ruled in favor of the psychological parent, explaining that “the aim of the
119. Id. at *1 (“[Father] previously executed a permanent custody agreement that granted
the child’s maternal grandparents permanent custody of the child.”); see also id. at *2 n.3
(“The mother’s custodial rights were also transferred to the grandparents by enforcement of
their custody agreement. According to the parties, the permanency plan is for the child to
remain in the legal custody of the grandparents, per the terms of the custody agreement.”).
120. Id.
121. Id. at *2 n.3.
122. See, e.g., In re J.C., 2017 WL 4772949, at *1 (noting that, according to the West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, prior to the abuse and neglect
proceeding, the father had “previously executed a permanent custody agreement that granted
the child’s maternal grandparents permanent custody of the child” and that the father was
incarcerated at the time of the petition’s filing); In re T.B., 2020 WL 6482958, at *1 (noting
that when the Child Protective Services (CPS) worker first interviewed the paternal
grandfather, he stated that “he had cared for [the child] ‘on and off for a couple of years’”).
123. In re D.P., No. 20-0499, 2021 WL 982769, at *3 (W. Va. Mar. 16, 2021).
124. In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138, 144 (W. Va. 2005).
125. Id. at 144–45.
126. Id. at 154.
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governing statute is to secure the best interests of the children whose custody
is to be determined and to promote stability and certainty in their young
lives.”127 Looking to the statutory language, the court emphasized the
importance of “[c]ontinuity of existing parent-child attachments.”128 On the
court’s view, recognition of the psychological parent would “allow[]
continuity of care by the person whom he currently regards as his parent and
would thus provide stability and certainty in his life.”129
In many of the cases, the child was in the custody of the functional parent
at the outset of the litigation. Thus, in such cases, recognizing psychological
parents and protecting their right to maintain a relationship with a child does
not create a new household to which a child will be shuttled. Instead, doing
so secures the child’s primary home. For example, in Clifford K., the court
recognized that the “child has been in one home for a substantial period”—
the home of the psychological parent—and disturbing that arrangement by
shifting custody would harm the child’s “sense of security.”130 Thus, as the
court concluded, recognizing the child’s psychological parent and entering
“a formal custodial arrangement would . . . secure the familial environment
to which the child has become accustomed and . . . accord parental status to
the adult he already views in this capacity.”131 In situations of this kind, the
recognition of a third parent does not create disruption. Instead, it promotes
continuity.
In the Andra F. case discussed above, the court likewise affirmed the
children’s continued custodial placement with their grandparents.132 In the
case, the mother and father previously agreed that the father would be the
primary residential parent even though both parents knew the father “lived
with [his parents], . . . worked away from the home during the week and was
at home occasionally on weekends.”133 Due to this consensual arrangement,
according to the family court, the grandparents had for several years “clearly
provided for the daily care of the children, including medical, dental,
educational, bedtime routines, providing meals and bearing all of the
financial obligations of the children without assistance from the parents.”134
Both the father, who by the time of the litigation was incarcerated, and the
mother had essentially consented to the grandparents’ role as “psychological
parents.” When the mother later sought custody of the children, the court
127. Id. at 159.
128. Id. (quoting W. VA. CODE § 48-9-102(a)(1), (3) (2004)).
129. Id. at 160; see also Snyder v. Scheerer, 436 S.E.2d 299, 304 (W. Va. 1993) (“While
[we are] mindful of the natural parent’s right to custody of his own child absent compelling
circumstances necessitating a contrary result, we must also be cognizant of the fact that the
right of a natural parent must not be examined in a vacuum; it must be tempered by the rights
of the child and balanced against those rights in some fashion. . . . These concerns are
indicative of our continuing emphasis on the best interests of the child as a guiding force in
all custody matters, as well as a recognition that the child has his own individual rights.”).
130. In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d at 159.
131. Id. at 160.
132. Andra F. v. Anthony H., No. 15-0445, 2016 WL 700585, at *1 (W. Va. Feb. 16, 2016).
133. Id.
134. Id. at *4.
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noted that she had “failed to object to [the grandparents’] role as primary
caretakers for the children and knowingly left the children with them.”135
Ultimately, the court affirmed the children’s continued placement with their
grandparents.136
In another recent case, L.H., which was also discussed above, parties who
the court described as “Standing Grandparents” had provided the child with
“the only safe and stable home he had known.”137 The father, who lived
across the country, sought custody of the child. Refusing to vest custodial
rights in the Standing Grandparents would remove the child from a stable
home with the individuals who parented him since birth and instead send him
to another state to live with his father, with whom—prior to the instant
proceeding—the child had never lived.138
It is much rarer to see individuals seeking functional parent status who are
not living with the child, and West Virginia courts typically do not credit the
claims of such individuals.139 For example, in a 2007 decision denying the
claims of a couple alleging themselves to be psychological parents, the court
explained that, while the couple had “provided some level of care for [the
child],” they did not “reside in the same household” with the child and did
not “routinely serve as additional parents to [the child].”140
In West Virginia, the psychological parent doctrine protects not just the
interests but also the rights of the child. For example, the court invoked the
“equitable rights of the child” in a 1990 case in which the child had “lived
with or been taken care of by his maternal grandmother for the majority of
his young life and almost exclusively” for the past three years.141 To protect
the child’s rights with respect to his existing living arrangement with his
grandmother, the court reversed the trial court’s award of custody to the
father, who had been absent from the child’s life for several years.142
From this perspective, we see that courts are rarely confronted with a
realistic concern that the legal recognition of multiple parents will cause
children to be stretched too thin. Instead, courts in these cases are often asked
to step in where the child’s psychological parent is already functioning as an
additional parent. And, at least in the West Virginia cases, this additional
parent often is, and has been, functioning as the child’s primary parent. In
all but three of the multi-parent cases, the alleged functional parent had
functioned as the child’s primary caregiver, sometimes in addition to but

135. Id.
136. Id. at *5.
137. In re L.H., No. 17-0102, 2017 WL 5157367, at *5 (W. Va. Nov. 7, 2017).
138. Id.
139. In re L.H., No. 17-0769, 2018 WL 317057, at *5 (W. Va. Jan. 8, 2018); In re Visitation
and Custody of Senturi N.S.V., 652 S.E.2d 490, 499 (W. Va. 2007).
140. In re Visitation and Custody of Senturi N.S.V., 652 S.E.2d at 499.
141. See In re Brandon L.E., 394 S.E.2d 515, 523 (W. Va. 1990).
142. See id. at 523–24. While both the mother and father were originally legal parents
asserting rights to custody, the mother, who had been involuntarily committed, eventually
consented to termination of her parental rights. See id. at 518.
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often in the absence of a biological or legal parent.143 Hence, in reality, the
result of denying this relationship would be not only to disrupt the child’s
stable household, but also to sever an intact and important parent-child
relationship. As the West Virginia Supreme Court explained in a case in
which the child had been parented for several years by her aunt and uncle,
“It is a traumatic experience for children to undergo sudden and dramatic
changes in their permanent custodians.”144 Accordingly, in such cases, the
court continued, lower courts should issue orders that “foster the emotional
adjustment of the children” and that seek to “maintain as much stability as
possible in their lives.”145 Termination of these relationships can be
traumatic because—from the perspective of the children—these relationships
can be critically important.146
Of course, in some of the West Virginia cases, the psychological parent’s
request for custody is denied. Yet, even when courts decline to award
custody to the psychological parent in deference to the superior rights of a
legal parent, they often fashion remedies in ways that recognize and preserve
the parental relationship between the child and the psychological parent. The
1989 Honaker v. Burnside147 case illustrates this point. The child, who was
six years old at the time of the court decision, lived with her biological mother
and stepfather from the age of one.148 As the court explained, “These familial
surroundings are the only ones she ha[d] ever known, and it [wa]s undisputed
that she ha[d] developed a close and loving relationship with her
stepfather.”149 For his part, though, the biological father maintained a
relationship with the child through visitation.150 When the mother was killed
in a car accident, the stepfather became the child’s guardian.151 The
biological father then sought custody of the child.152 Recognizing the
superior rights of the biological father, the court granted the father’s
petition.153 The court nonetheless acknowledged and took account of the fact
that this change of custody would, as a psychologist testified, inflict “added
trauma” on the child.154 Accordingly, at the same time that it awarded
custody to the father, the court also “provided for a transition period in an

143. This was not the case in In re T.B., No. 20-0369, 2020 WL 6482958 (W. Va. Nov. 4,
2020); In re L.H., 2018 WL 317057; and Simmons v. Comer, 438 S.E.2d 530 (W. Va. 1993).
144. Snyder v. Scheerer, 436 S.E.2d 299, 307 (W. Va. 1993) (quoting In re James M., 408
S.E.2d 400, 409 (W. Va. 1991)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 308 (noting that “[t]he mission for these mothers [that is, the child’s biological
mother, and the child’s aunt who served as her primary caretaker for a number of years] is the
same”).
147. 388 S.E.2d 322, 323 (W. Va. 1989).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 323–24.
152. Id. at 323.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 323–24.
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attempt to lessen the trauma to [the child] of such a dramatic change in her
life on the heels of the loss of her mother.”155
Invoking “the need for stability in the child’s life,” the court explained that
a failure to order continued contact with the child’s stepfather (and
half-brother) “would contribute to instability rather than provide stability.”156
“[T]he need for continued contact,” the court explained, “is imperative in
order to provide [the child] as stable an environment as possible.”157
Adopting a functional rather than formal understanding of family, the court
held that “visitation rights with her stepfather . . . and her half-brother . . .
should be conferred upon [the child] in order to ensure that she is not stripped
of the right to continue a close relationship with the people she considers her
family.”158 Thus, even as it provided less than custody to the stepfather, the
court concluded its decision with the observation that the child’s “future
happiness and emotional security will rely heavily on the efforts of these two
fathers.”159
In another case, In re K.H.,160 the court held that the child “and her
psychological parent/grandmother [we]re entitled to continued visitation,”
even though the father was entitled to custody.161 The grandmother had
become the child’s guardian after the child’s mother died in a car accident
when the child was one year old.162 The father, who “had no contact with
the child during the first year of her life,”163 “became gradually more
involved in the life of his daughter and sought additional custodial
responsibilities.”164 In overturning the family court’s conclusion that the
grandmother did not qualify as a psychological parent, the court explained
that “[f]rom the child’s birth and over the course of the next eight years, the
grandmother has served as a parent to [the child] in every conceivable
capacity.”165
Orders that vest custody in a legal parent but also provide for continued
contact with psychological parents may arise in cases involving child welfare
involvement. For example, in In re D.P.,166 the court awarded “permanent
placement with the child’s father,” but also ruled that the child’s
grandmother, with whom the child had lived before and during the abuse and
155. Id. at 324.
156. Id. at 326 (quoting Michael J. Lewinski, Note, Visitation Beyond the Traditional
Limitations, 60 IND. L.J. 191, 219 (1984)).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (emphasis added); see also Snyder v. Scheerer, 436 S.E.2d 299, 307–08 (W. Va.
1993) (transferring custody from the functional parents to the legal parent, but remanding with
directions “that the Appellees [the child’s aunt and uncle] be awarded extensive and
meaningful visitation rights,” and noting, in closing, that “[t]he mission for these mothers is
the same”).
160. 773 S.E.2d 20 (W. Va. 2015).
161. Id. at 32.
162. Id. at 22.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 28.
165. Id.
166. No. 20-0499, 2021 WL 982769 (W. Va. Mar. 16, 2021).
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neglect proceeding against the mother and father, “receive regular visits and
involvement in the child’s life.”167 In another dependency-involved case, the
court described the child as having “two sets of parents”—the child’s
biological parents and the child’s foster parents, who had raised the child,
born in April 1990, from December 1990 to October 1995, at which point the
child was reunified with his biological parents.168 The court had no trouble
concluding that “both sets of parents, foster and biological, obviously loved
and wanted this child.”169 In “recommending consideration of continued
contact” between the child and the foster parents, the court stressed the
guiding inquiry: “whether a strong emotional bond exists between the child
and an individual such that cessation in contact might be harmful to the child,
both in its transitory period of adjusting to a new custodial arrangement and
in its long-term emotional development.”170
Further, even when courts reject claims for custody or continued contact
under the psychological parent doctrine, the individuals may have other
avenues that facilitate the child’s continued relationship with them. About
half of the functional parent cases from West Virginia involve
grandparents.171 Thus, even if they were not recognized as functional parents
entitled to custody, they would have a right under the West Virginia
grandparent visitation law to seek “reasonable visitation.”172 The West
Virginia Supreme Court has explicitly acknowledged this reality. Even as it
denied standing to seek custody under the psychological parent doctrine to a
child’s grandmother, who had been the child’s primary caregiver for a
decade, the court cited the state’s grandparent visitation statute in
recognizing the importance of the child’s “desire to have a continued
relationship with his grandmother, who appears to have been his
psychological parent for many years.”173

167. Id. at *4.
168. In re Jonathan G., 482 S.E.2d 893, 906 (W. Va. 1996). As the court noted, given that
the foster parents had the child “with them for so long, providing him with love, constancy,
and care in his earliest years, . . . [they] probably were more knowledgeable than anyone as to
this child’s needs.” Id. at 729.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 912.
171. See In re Brandon L.E., 394 S.E.2d 515 (W. Va. 1990); Ortner v. Pritt, 419 S.E.2d
907 (W. Va. 1992); Overfield v. Collins, 483 S.E.2d 27 (W. Va. 1996); In re Antonio R.A.,
719 S.E.2d 850 (W. Va. 2011); In re K.H., 773 S.E.2d 20 (W. Va. 2015); J.E. v. L.A., No. 140137, 2015 WL 3751807 (W. Va. June 15, 2015); Andra F. v. Anthony H., No. 15-0445, 2016
WL 700585 (W. Va. Feb. 16, 2016); In re K.R., No. 17-1012, 2018 WL 1709713 (W. Va.
Apr. 9, 2018); In re D.P., 2021 WL 982769; In re Custody of Cottrill, 346 S.E.2d 47 (W. Va.
1986); In re J.C., No. 17-0362, 2017 WL 4772949 (W. Va. Oct. 23, 2017); In re N.A., 711
S.E.2d 280 (W. Va. 2011); In re T.B., No. 20-0369, 2020 WL 6482958 (W. Va. Nov. 4, 2020);
State ex rel. R.H. v. Bloom, No. 17-0002, 2017 WL 1788946 (W. Va. May 5, 2017); see also
In re L.H., No. 17-0002, 2017 WL 5157367 (W. Va. Nov. 7, 2017) (involving “standing
grandparents”).
172. W. VA. CODE § 48-10-501 (2022) (“The circuit court or family court shall grant
reasonable visitation to a grandparent upon a finding that visitation would be in the best
interests of the child and would not substantially interfere with the parent-child relationship.”).
173. See In re Antonio R.A., 719 S.E.2d at 862.
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From this perspective, concerns about pulling children too thin, or creating
or exacerbating conflict in their lives, likely would not be mitigated by
denying psychological parent status. In cases involving grandparents—
again, about half of the West Virginia cases—contact would likely continue
in any event.174 The unresolved question in these cases is really just whether
the grandparent who had been serving as the child’s primary custodian would
be able to continue to function in that role. Continued contact with the
grandparent likely would be awarded.175
Seen from the perspective of West Virginia’s psychological parent cases,
multi-parent families do not look novel or rare. And legal recognition of
multiple parental relationships does not look new. The paradigmatic scene
of multi-parenthood imagined in contemporary commentary is barely present
in the West Virginia case law. LGBTQ+ parents appear only once.176
Assisted reproduction is nowhere mentioned. Instead, multi-parent families
in West Virginia have existed for decades, and in forms that are more diverse
than commonly assumed. Courts’ accommodation of multi-parent families
in West Virginia is longstanding. Courts have routinely applied the
psychological parent doctrine, even when a child has two legal parents, to
recognize a child’s primary parental relationship. Seen from the perspective
of West Virginia’s case law, multi-parent recognition may not create or
exacerbate conflict and instability in children’s lives, but instead may secure
critical parent-child relationships and provide permanency for a child who
has faced instability and uncertainty.
CONCLUSION
Broadening our lens from the rare and new paradigmatic case to the fuller
array of cases in which multi-parenthood actually arises, the view from West
Virginia allows us to see that courts have accommodated multi-parent
families for decades. Bringing these overlooked cases to the fore, we can see
that the speculative concerns about the effects of multi-parent recognition are
either misplaced or overstated.
Uncovering this reality allows us to shift the conversation away from
questions of whether to allow multi-parent recognition and instead toward
questions of how to structure such recognition. Questions about how to
structure multi-parent recognition include whether functional parents should
have a status that is different from, and unequal to, that of legal parents, as is

174. See, e.g., id.; Overfield, 483 S.E.2d at 38.
175. See, e.g., Overfield, 483 S.E.2d at 38 (“Regardless of who ultimately is awarded
custody of these children, the children should be able to continue in a caring and loving
relationship with the person who is not awarded custody so as not to interrupt the continuity
and the bonding that has occurred over these past many years.”); see also W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 48-10-501 (2022) (“The circuit court or family court shall grant reasonable visitation to a
grandparent upon a finding that visitation would be in the best interests of the child and would
not substantially interfere with the parent-child relationship.”).
176. See In re Clifford K., 619 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 2005).
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the case in West Virginia.177 Or, as is true under the UPA, whether they
should stand in parity with other legal parents. Even if multiple parents stand
in parity, how should courts approach the questions of legal and residential
custody, as well as support obligations?178 Under either multi-parenthood
approach, what showing should be required to establish a person as a
functional parent?
And does recognition of a functional parent
impermissibly infringe on the rights of any other legal parents? These are
some of the questions to which we will turn in subsequent work.

177. See, e.g., Cahn & Carbone, Three (or More) Parents, supra note 5, at 407 (“The
multiple-parent model is a good idea, however, only so long as it is applied to recognize the
realities of multiple types of families and the need to accord differing—and unequal—rights
to those deemed to be parents based on function. Fully developing what unequal parenthood
means is a project that will unfold in the courts—and in families.”); see also Laufer-Ukeles &
Blecher-Prigat, supra note 28, at 454 (“Functional parenthood is different from formal
biological or adoptive parenthood and should therefore be treated differently.”).
178. See, e.g., Cahn & Carbone, Three (or More) Parents, supra note 5, at 406 (“As the
law recognizes multiple parenting roles, it should move away from a rigid insistence on
parental equality to greater differentiation between equal and unequal parental
relationships.”); Appleton, supra note 7, at 45 (“[T]he advent of multi-parentage provides an
opportunity to take a fresh look at the special challenges of shared decisionmaking.”); Jacobs,
supra note 23, at 326 (arguing for “relative rights of the parents” in multi-parent families).

